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Abstract
The substitutability of inputs to health production in hospitals has recently be-
come an issue in Germany. New regulations concerning the renumeration of
hospitals set incentives to reduce patients’ length of stay and, in turn, to op-
erate less care-intensive. Based on data at the individual hospital level from
Germany, covering the years 2006 to 2008, we test whether substitutability of
inputs and its change over time exhibits heterogeneity across different types of
ownership. If found in the data, this may point at differently owned hospitals
adapting differently to the new regulations. In order to avoid relying on input
prices as regressors, which exhibit only very limited variation across hospitals,
we pursue a price-free empirical approach by calculating technical elasticities
of substitution from the multiplier representation of data envelopment analy-
sis. The empirical analysis yields pronounces ownership-specific heterogeneity
in the technical elasticity of substitution between physicians and nurses indi-
cating that non-profit hospitals operate particularly ‘physician-intensive’. Yet,
this pattern is stable over the considered period.
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data envelopment analysis.
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1 Introduction
The provision of inpatient care is undergoing a radical change in Germany. While
formerly a quasi administrative task, nowadays more and more hospitals are run in
the manner of businesses. This goes along with increasing share of private hospital
ownership. Yet, changes in the environment go beyond privatization alone. There
is a steadily increasing pressure on hospitals of all ownership types to improve their
efficiency for several reasons. First, beginning in 1993, annual rises in hospital ex-
penditures (i.e., revenues from the hospital’s point of view) were constrained by the
growth rate of revenues of the social health insurance. Thus, hospitals’ costs usu-
ally rise faster than their revenues and hospitals are constantly forced to improve
their productivity. Second, the German federal states – although in charge of pay-
ing for investments of hospitals while health insurance companies account for the
running costs – are investing decreasingly less. Thus, hospitals are required to gen-
erate profits in order to make own investments in new technologies. Third, while
municipalities and churches as owners of not-for-profit hospitals used to be able to
balance deficits of their hospitals in the past, this is typically not possible anymore.
Most importantly, however, the remuneration system for hospitals was radically
reformed in 2004. Until then, hospitals’ revenues depended on the patients’ length
of stay. The reform introduced a DRG based remuneration system, which no longer
rewards length of stay but rather set strong incentives to keep patients’ stay as short
as possible. This implicitly changed the scope of hospitals in Germany. While be-
fore 2004 (short term) nursing has – at least implicitly – been one of the their genuine
scopes,1 this does no longer apply under the DRG remuneration system. Hence, be-
sides pressing for operating more cost-efficiently in general, the new remuneration
1In these times it was common practice, to keep patients some extra days in hospital until they
were able to cope with their every day life, though no further medical treatments were carried out
on these patients.
2
system sets incentives for adjusting input use. In particular, since nursing no longer
pays off in its own right, reducing nursing staff might be a promising strategy to op-
erate more profitable. Indeed, a significant decline in nursing staff can be observed
over the last decade. While the number of full-time equivalent doctors increased by
21% between 2000 and 2009, the number of nurses decreased by 10% in the same
period (Destatis, 2000, 2009). The focus of the present paper is on the question of
whether substitutability of nursing staff varies for different types of hospital owner-
ship. If such deviations are found in the data, one may conclude that – say privately
owned hospitals – have better coped with the reformed remuneration systems and
already reduced nursing staff.
From this perspective, factor demand and factor substitution become relevant
objects of empirical research on the provision of inpatient care. How easily may
nursing staff be substituted by other production factors such as medical staff, capi-
tal and medical supplies? The conventional econometric approach for answering
this type of questions is to estimate a cost function – or a system of cost-share
equations – and to calculate elasticities of substitution from the estimated coef-
ficients attached to price-variables, in particular cross-products of logged factor
prices. However, this elegant approach, which closely adheres to the underlying
micro-economic theory, may often be ill-suited for being applied to real – in par-
ticular cross-section – data, as identification solely rests on variation in price data.
Factor prices typically do not vary across hospitals. Moreover, observed variation
in average factor cost may capture unobserved heterogeneity2, rather than genuine
exogenous price variation, rendering average factor cost invalid proxies for actual
prices.
To circumvent the problem of insufficient or endogenous price variation, we pro-
2Hospitals may, for instance, specialize on more severe cases and hence hire better skilled staff.
Hence, higher average wages do not reflect exogenous price variation but the hospital’s preference
for well skilled personell.
3
pose an approach for estimation substitutability of input factors, that does not rest
on estimating price coefficients. We rather pursue an approach that rests on data
envelopment analysis (DEA) a non-parametric production model, which is formu-
lated in terms of physical inputs and outputs rather than prices. DEA does not
involve a concept of causality, as it is the case for econometric production models
based on, for instance, estimating a production function. Hence, endogeneity of
inputs and outputs is no caveat for DEA.3 As DEA non-parametrically envelopes
input-output combinations observed in the data, it estimates a multidimensional
surface composed of numerous linear facets that can be interpreted as production
possibility frontier. Movements in a certain direction along these facets, hence, cap-
ture how two inputs trade off against each other, leaving outputs and all other in-
puts unchanged. Thus, our approach rests on estimating the relevant slopes of these
hyperplanes and using these estimates for calculation technical elasticities of sub-
stitution, which allow us for measuring the ease of substitution of nursing staff by
other inputs to health production in hospitals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
data, Section 3 discusses the econometric approach, Section 4 reports and discusses
the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Data
The data used for the empirical analysis originate from the German hospital and pa-
tient statistic (Deutsche Krankenhausstatistik), which is collected and administered
by the Statistical Offices of the German Federal States. The hospital and patient
statistic is an annual exhaustive survey of hospitals in Germany, with participation
3This would apply to conventional regression approaches such as straight forward estimation of
a production function.
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in this survey being mandatory. Hence the information provided in the data is very
close to being complete. Yet, due to data protection regulations, only a 70% random
sample of all hospitals was made available to use. Confining the analysis to the
years 2006, 2007, and 2008 and excluding observations with missing data, this leads
to a sample of altogether 2 232 hospital-year observations.4
The data covers a wide range of hospital specific information. Most important,
information on input use, such as the number of doctors, nurses, beds, and costs
is available in the data on a very detailed basis. Personnel input is measured in
full-time equivalents. Moreover, hospitals’ technical equipment is documented in
detail. Herr (2008) describes the data set in detail. As a major measure of a hos-
pitals’ service generation, the data comprise the number of treated cases per year.
To make the output comparable over hospitals, cases should be weighted by sever-
ity. The case-mix-index (CMI) that officially exists since 2004 in Germany would
be a preferred measure. However, it is not reported in the data. As an alternative,
Herr (2008) generates a case-mix by comparing length of stay (LOS) of each case in
a hospital with average LOS per diagnosis over all hospitals. However, since hos-
pitals have an incentive to reduce length of stay in response to the recent reform,
this does not seem to be a good measure in our case. We follow RWI (2010) and use
imputed CMIs. To do this, we gather data on CMI and the detailed department and
bed structure as provided by, e.g. Klauber et al. (2010) and Destatis (2009b) for the
full sample of all German hospitals in each year. The coefficients from the regres-
sion of CMI on department structure, ownership type, and regional information are
then used to calculate the predicted CMI for each hospital in the data set. Detailed
regression results can be found in RWI (2010).
Finally, the ownership type is provided in the data set. We distinguish three
4We also trim the data set by excluding hospitals with very high and very low average lengths
of stay. This excludes, among others, highly specialized private hospitals that are not comparable to
the normal general hospitals.
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different types, i.e. private, private non-profit (e.g. church owned), and private for
profit. With a share of 12%, private hospitals are underrepresented in our final data
set (compared to about 30% in the full population). This is in particular due to the
exclusion of highly specialized hospitals that are mainly private ones.
3 The Empirical Approach
3.1 DEA and Marginal Rates of Substitution
In order to analyze factor substitution without relying on variation in factor prices
and without using endogenous factor demand as explanatory variables, we pursue
a non-parametric data envelopment analysis based approach. Data envelopment
analysis (DEA), first introduced by Charnes et al. (1978), is a well established non-
parametric method for efficiency analysis. For a given sample of input and output
combinations, i.e. a sample of production units, DEA envelopes the data by a con-
vex, piecewise linear hull which is interpreted as the production possibility frontier.
Typically, applications of data envelopment analyses aim at calculating efficiency
scores θ ∈ (0, 1] for each production unit, which then can be compared or ranked
on the basis of estimated efficiencies. These estimated scores are defined as the fac-
tor by with input use could be reduced with outputs left unchanged.5 That is, θ
measures the relative radial distance of an observed production unit from the es-
timated production possibility frontier that envelopes the data. In computational
5This represents ‘input-oriented’ efficiency. DEA also allows for calculation ‘output-oriented’
efficiency, where efficiency scores θout ≥ 1 represent the factor by which output may be increased
with input use left unchanged.
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terms, DEA rests on solving the linear program
min
θ,λ
θ subject to (1)
θxm0 −
N
∑
i=1
λixmi ≥ 0 m = 1, ..., M
N
∑
i=1
λiyli − yl0 ≥ 0 l = 1, ..., L
λi ≥ 0 ∀ i.
Here, yl, with l = 1, ..., L, and xm, with m = 1, ..., M, denote outputs and inputs of
the analyzed production process. i = 0, ..., N denotes observations, where the one
under consideration is indexed by 0. If the solution θ∗ takes the value 1, the relevant
production units is technically efficient, i.e. it is located on the frontier. While (1) is
the representation of DEA that – for computational reasons – is usually used for
empirical applications, it is just the dual representation to
max
u,v
L
∑
l=1
ulyl0 subject to (2)
M
∑
m=1
vmxm0 = 1
M
∑
m=1
vmxmi −
L
∑
l=1
ulyli ≥ 0 i = 1, ..., N
vm, ul ≥ 0 ∀m, l.
While (1) is the envelop representation, (2) is the multiplier representation, where
both models are equivalent as the solution to the former (θ∗,λ∗1 , ...,λ
∗
N) is mutually
consistent with the solution to the latter (u∗1 , ..., u
∗
L, v
∗
1 , ..., v
∗
M), (cf. Cooper et al.,
2007, 51-52). Yet, for the analysis of factor substitution the multiplier form is the
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relevant one. In an optimal solution to (2) at least one constraint i is binding. Hence,
M
∑
m=1
v∗mxmi −
L
∑
l=1
u∗l yli = 0 (3)
defines a hyperplane that represents a facet of the piecewise liner production possi-
bility frontier. Hence, implicitly differentiating (3) yields an estimate for the marginal
rate of substitution (MRS) between two inputs m and q, Thanassoulis et al. (cf. 2004,
p. 102)
MRSmq = −∂xm
∂xq
= − v
∗
q
v∗m
(4)
Yet, ratios obtained from the multipliers form of the model can be interpreted as
marginal rates of substitution and marginal rates of transformation, respectively
(cf. Olesen and Petersen, 2003; Thanassoulis et al., 2004, p. 102). Figure 1 illustrates
how estimates for MRS are derived from an estimated DEA production possibility
frontier.
One problem with this approach is that v∗m may take the value of zero, not allow-
ing for calculating MRS. Zero multipliers indicate that the relevant facet of the es-
timated production possibility frontier is vertical (resp. horizontal) in the qm-plain.
This implies that consumption of input q could still be reduced without cost, even
though the relevant production unit operates at the efficiency frontier. Reductions
in input consumption that can be archived by moving vertically (resp. horizontally)
along the efficiency frontier are referred to as input slacks S−m . Output slacks S+l are
analogously defined, as additional output that can be achieved without extra-cost
by moving along the frontier. Slack values are directly derived from the solution to
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Figure 1: DEA based estimates of MRS
(1) as
S−m = θ∗xm0 −
N
∑
i=1
λ∗i xmi m = 1, ..., M (5)
S+l =
N
∑
i=1
λ∗i yli − yl0 l = 1, ..., L (6)
Slacks are directly linked to the multipliers obtained from (2) trough the comple-
mentary slackness theorem
v∗mS−m = 0 (7)
u∗l S
+
l = 0 (8)
9
In other words, the presence of input slacks renders multipliers zero which im-
pedes our approach to estimating marginal rates of substitution. This is in line with
theory, where the concept of factor substitution is well defined only for efficient
production units. Thus, rather than using observed inputs and outputs for esti-
mating MRS, we base the analysis on their fully efficient counterparts, i.e. xoptm0 ≡
θ∗xm0 − S−m and yoptl0 ≡ yl0 + S+m , and re-estimate v∗m, which then less often6 take
zero values.7 The suggested approach is similar to the one proposed by Cooper
et al. (2000). However, the latter does not aim at measuring input substitution for
fixed values of all other inputs, but assumes that of all other inputs (and outputs)
are adjusted optimally. This in turn means that the substitutability is measured
contingent on given prices for inputs and outputs.
3.2 Measuring the ease of Input-Substitution
Most applications addressing the issue of factor substitution use elasticities of sub-
stitution (ES) for measuring the ease of input-substitution. ES measures the local
curvature of an isoquant. Hence, it is inconsistent with piece-wise linearity of DEA
based production possibility frontiers, as locally the second derivative is either zero
or undefined. One approach to overcome this caveat of DEA is to smooth the fron-
tier estimated by DEA (cf. Nacif et al., 2009). Yet, this method is feasible only for
small problems. We take a different approach by rather than using elasticities of
substitution, we use the technical elasticity of substitution (TES) proposed by Fron-
6Zero slacks, however, do not guarantee non-zero multipliers, cf. (7); moreover even non-zero
multipliers may numerically still very close to zero.
7That is, we project any unit onto the efficiency frontier and remove any slacks. Hence all
units are Pareto-Koopmans efficient. In applications focussing on slacks, one would typically
not use slacks as defined in (5) directly. Rather, at an intermediate step, slacks S−m , S+l and
weights λi are re-estimated with θ∗ kept fixed, by solving maxλ, S−m S+l (∑
M
m=1 S
−
m + ∑
L
l=1 S
+
l ) subject
to θ∗xm0 − ∑Ni=1 λixmi = S−m ∀ m, ∑Ni=1 λiyli − yl0 = S+l ∀ l, and λi, S−m , S+l ≥ 0. This yields the
max-slack solution of (1).
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del (2004). This measure is defined as TESmq ≡ − ∂xm∂xq
xq
xm and in our application is
measured by
T̂ES
m
q = −
v∗q
v∗m
xoptq
xoptm
. (9)
TES simply re-formulates MRS in terms relative rather than relative changes and,
hence, is not based on second derivatives of the estimated production possibility
frontier and is consistent with DEA. TES measures substitution possibilities that
are completely dictated by technology, since this measure – unlike elasticities of
substitution – does not involve any optimality assumptions such as cost minimiz-
ing behavior. TES, for this reason corresponds to our ‘price-free’ approach. Another
problem with DEA based measures of substitutability is that estimates of (4) are
very sensitive to numerical inaccuracy and my for this reason suffer from a severe
outlier problem. Moreover, zero weights may for some observations render esti-
mated TRS infinite. For these reasons, rather than means, we calculate medians of
estimates for (9) and compare them across ownership types.8
The solution for the multiplier representation (u∗1 , ..., u
∗
L, v
∗
1 , ..., v
∗
M) is not unique,
as those units that span the efficiency frontier adjoin several of its facets (e.g. Rosen
et al., 1998). For this reason, MRS strictly speaking is undefined for these units and
(9) measures substitution possibility along a single arbitrarily selected adjoining
facet. This arbitrariness adds some noise to our empirical analysis. Yet, as we are
not interested in estimating TES for particular hospitals but median TES for certain
groups of hospitals, this represents a minor problem to our empirical application.
8Standard errors for the estimated medians are bootstrapped.
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3.3 Detection of Outliers
DEA – and related non-parametric methods in efficiency analysis – has frequently
been criticized for being purely deterministic and hence being very sensitive to
measurement error and outliers. A recent literature addresses this issue by sug-
gesting so called partial frontier approaches. These approaches, namely order-m
(Cazals et al., 2002) and order-α (Aragon et al., 2005; Daouia and Simar, 2007) effi-
ciency analysis, envelope the data by a non-convex hull, but allow for units to be
located beyond the estimated frontier, i.e. these units are ‘super-efficient’. Here, m
∈ N+ and 0 < α ≤ 1 serve as trimming parameters that determine the share of
super-efficient units, where for extreme parameter values (m→ ∞; α = 1) this share
becomes zero. Daraio and Simar (2007) suggest a method for outlier detection based
on the idea of increasing the value of m – respectively α – will linearly decrease the
share of super-efficient units, if outliers are absent from the data. Strong deviations
from linearity, therefore, indicate that those units still located beyond the frontier
are indeed outliers und should not be included in the efficiency analysis. In our
application, we initially run this (order-α based) based procedure on our data and
excluded those hospitals identified as outliers from the subsequent data envelop-
ment analysis.
3.4 Model Specification
The empirical application is based on a simple four-inputs-single-output technol-
ogy. In detail, we regard the weighted number of cases, i.e. (predicted) CMI times
the total number of cases, as a homogenized output from a hospitals’ service gen-
eration. Three inputs are measured in purely physical units, i.e. in particular physi-
cians, nurses, and beds. The former two variables account for part time work by
being transformed to full time equivalents. Beds serve as proxy for capital use in
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production. The forth input is medical supplies, that as a composite commodity
cannot be measured in physical units. For this reasons expenditures divided by a
relevant price index serve as measure for input consumption.9 In order to account
for heterogeneity in size and scope across hospitals when applying DEA, variable
returns to scale rather than constant returns to scale are assumed.10 DEA is carried
out separately for each considered year in order to allow for changes in the produc-
tion technology over time. Yet, hospitals of different type of ownership are pooled
based on the assumption that ownership does not make a difference with respect to
the production technology, yet it may matter for the efficiency. Standard errors for
all results, in particular estimated median technical elasticities of substitution are
bootstrapped.11
4 Results
4.1 Outlier Detection
In order to identify – and subsequently exclude – outliers in the data that may se-
riously bias any DEA based efficiency analysis we run a series of order-α efficiency
analyses on the data. Figure 2 plots the share of super-efficient hospitals against
the benchmark level α. No obvious discontinuity is to be seen directly from the
plot which pointed at a certain fraction of seemingly extremely well performing
hospitals representing outliers. We hence try three technical approaches to identify
knickpoints in the plotted curve. The first is a global approach that is based on
9The price indices are also taken from RWI (2010).
10In technical terms, this means that the additional restriction ∑Ni=1 λi = 1 enters the optimization
problem (1) which is equivalent to adding a constant term −u0 to the linear combination of outputs
subject to maximization in (2); i.e. max
u,v
∑Ll=1 ulyl0 − u0.
11The bootstrap does not encompass the data envelopment analysis but is performed conditional
on the results obtained from DEA. This is done to avoid excessive computing time.
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splitting the series into two parts and fitting a linear or quadratic function to each.
The point of split that minimizes the BIC is regarded as point of discontinuity. The
other approaches are local ones and are based on the series of differences in dif-
ferences which serve as a non-parametric estimates of the curvature of the original
series. The first searches for the minimum values of the twice differenced series
that follow a non-negative value. The second looks for negative values that per-
sist after repeatedly smoothing the series of differences in differences by running
odd-spaced median smoothers. The latter and the global approach both suggest of
roughly 0.91. Yet this corresponds to a share of outliers of more than 80 % which
does not make much sense. Yet, the approach that rests on the rough twice differ-
enced series suggests a value of α of 0.999 which corresponds to a share of outliers
of just 8.6 %. Hence we exclude this relatively small fraction of well performing
hospitals from the DEA.12
4.2 Estimated Efficiency for the Full Sample
Table 1 displays estimated mean and median DEA efficiency scores by year and
type of ownership. Estimation results display limited variation in mean and me-
dian efficiency across types of ownership and years, with both taking values be-
tween 0.64 and 0.72. Nevertheless, for any year, private hospitals display the high-
est average technical efficiency where, in descriptive terms, efficiency differentials
compared to non-profit hospitals are statistically significant. The latter also exhibit
significantly lower efficiency compared to publicly owned hospitals. Yet, no sig-
nificant public-private efficiency differential exists. This result is broadly in line
with Herr et al. (2011) who use the same data source for the years 2002 to 2006 and
12We also carried out the analysis for the entire sample and did not exclude any potential outliers.
Some point estimates substantially differ from those reported in this section. Yet, in qualitative
terms, this analysis yields similar results.
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Figure 2: Detecting outliers using order-α partial frontier analysis
do not find significant differences in technical efficiency over ownership types.13
Moreover, average efficiency has not significantly changed over time.
4.3 Estimated TES
In this subsection we report estimated median TES for the four inputs to production
considered. Table 2 displays the estimated median of pooled TES. Here, a propor-
tional change in the number of physicians (docs) may be compensated by small
proportional changes in beds (beds) and medical consumables (cons). To a smaller
13Overall, the results on ownership-type differences in technical efficiency in the recent literature
on German hospitals is mixed, however. Herr (2008), using the same data set for the years 2001-
2003, finds private hospitals to be less efficient while Werblow et al. (2010) find private hospitals to
be more efficient than public ones.
15
Table 1: Estimated DEA Efficiency Scores
public non-profit private
2006
mean 0.670 0.652 0.689
median 0.644 0.632 0.663
s.e. 0.121 0.115 0.134
# of obs. 300 322 80
2007
mean 0.681 0.653 0.682
median 0.661 0.645 0.671
s.e. 0.121 0.110 0.121
# of obs. 293 313 81
2008
mean 0.687 0.661 0.718
median 0.663 0.650 0.697
s.e. 0.119 0.110 0.139
# of obs. 268 306 84
Notes: pooled DEA analysis assuming variable returns to scale.
degree this also holds for proportional changes in the number of nurses (care). Yet,
a proportional decrease in the number of beds requires much larger proportional
increase in the amount of medical consumables in order to keep hospital output
constant. The result of hospital beds representing an input to hospital service pro-
duction that is particularly hard to be substituted, seems to conflict with the notion
of numerous excess beds existing in German hospitals. Yet, it might simply capture
that the number of beds imposes a rigide cap on a hospitals capacity for acquiring
cases.
The finding of a relatively small proportional increase in the number of nurses
– and also beds and consumables – being sufficient for compensation for a much
larger proportional decrease in the number of physicians takes one somewhat by
surprise. It has, however, to be pointed out that this results does not hold for each
individual hospital. Rather, individual estimates TESs exhibit distinctive hetero-
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Table 2: Estimated Median Pooled TES
TEScaredocs TES
beds
docs TES
cons
docs TES
beds
care TES
cons
care TES
cons
beds
0.276 0.002 0.002 0.045 0.055 3.640
geneity including very large estimates that by far exceed the value of one. But still,
the estimate for median TEScaredocs points at large share of hospitals operating rela-
tively ‘physician intensive’ rendering a further reduction of nursing, beds, or the
use of consumables difficult. This in turn means that the problem of excess beds
that can be saved without any impact on a hospital performance does not exist for
the median hospital.
Table 3 displays estimated median TES separately by type of ownership an year.
This reveals some differentials in the substitutivity of physicians and nurses across
types of ownership. Here the surprisingly small estimate for TEScaredocs, found for
the whole sample, is less pronounced for publicly owned hospitals. Private hospi-
tals exhibit a relatively moderate median value, while for non-profit hospitals the
corresponding value for TEScaredocs is extremely low. This indicates that ownership
matters for input use in hospitals with non-profit hospitals operating particularly
‘physician-intensive’ while public hospitals seem to employ a more balanced input
mix. This, however, has not necessarily to be attributed to a causal effect of own-
ership. It may also be that hospitals of different ownership-type perform different
tasks, not captured by the output-measure used for this analysis, which makes them
choose a different combination of input-factors. Besides TEScaredocs for which statisti-
cally significant median differentials are found for public compared to non-profit
hospitals (all considered years), public compared to private hospitals (just 2006)
and non-profit compared to private hospitals (just 2008), estimated technical elas-
ticities of substitution do not systematically differ between types of ownership.
Considering changes in median TES over time, Table 3 does not indicate much
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Table 3: Estimated Median TES by Ownership and Year
public non-profit private
Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
2006
med. TEScaredocs 0.713 0.131 0.020 0.005 0.131 0.128
med. TESbedsdocs 0.007 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006
med. TESconsdocs 0.017 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.005
med. TESbedscare 0.018 0.047 0.140 0.034 0.134 0.104
med. TESconscare 0.045 0.047 0.077 0.110 0.065 0.168
med. TESconsbeds 3.170 0.555 3.081 0.663 3.528 0.568
2007
med. TEScaredocs 1.043 0.227 0.071 0.016 0.384 0.303
med. TESbedsdocs 0.030 0.018 0.002 0.003 0.021 0.014
med. TESconsdocs 0.041 0.040 0.002 0.002 0.048 0.039
med. TESbedscare 0.016 0.056 0.073 0.053 0.017 0.273
med. TESconscare 0.021 0.074 0.052 0.104 0.038 0.217
med. TESconsbeds 3.350 0.572 3.771 0.230 3.860 0.598
2008
med. TEScaredocs 0.493 0.130 0.037 0.034 0.355 0.129
med. TESbedsdocs 0.006 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.032 0.016
med. TESconsdocs 0.017 0.029 0.000 0.001 0.050 0.037
med. TESbedscare 0.004 0.063 0.025 0.056 0.153 0.272
med. TESconscare 0.006 0.121 0.040 0.129 0.311 0.290
med. TESconsbeds 3.653 0.566 4.203 0.321 4.217 0.566
Notes: pooled DEA analysis assuming variables returns to scale; S.E.s bootstrapped.
change. Only for TEScaredocs a statistically significant change is found for non-profit
hospitals (2006 to 2007) and for public hospitals (2007 to 2008). Apart from these
few cases, estimated technical elasticities of substitution are fairly stable over the
considered period. This finding argues against the hypothesis of hospitals adapting
to the new remuneration scheme by changing the composition of input use. In turn,
this is also evidence against the hypothesis of hospitals, contingent on the type of
ownership, adapt differently to altered incentives.
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5 Conclusions
The present empirical analysis aims at measuring the substitutability of inputs in
hospitals in Germany. The main focus is on the questions of whether substitutabil-
ity differs across hospitals of different type of ownership and whether substitutabil-
ity has changed over time. First of all, we want to test whether differently owned
hospitals adapted differently to a recent change in hospital remuneration that set
strong incentives to reduce the length of patients’ stay and, in turn, set incentives to
minimize the provision of care. In order to avoid relying on price variation for iden-
tifying substitutability of inputs, we calculated technical elasticities of substitution
from the multiplier representation of data envelopment analysis.
As an initial result DEA yields some ownership specific heterogeneity in esti-
mated efficiency scores, with privately owned hospitals being the most efficient.
These efficiency differentials, however, are insignificant in statistical terms. This
also holds for changes in efficiency over time. Estimated DEA based measures of
input substitutability yield the somewhat puzzling result that for the median hospi-
tal physicians may be substituted at very low rate by nurses, and other inputs. This
points at hospitals operating rather physician intensive and seems to indicate that
hospitals input choice is inconsistent with cost minimization, since the high-cost
input high-skilled labor (physicians) is – though technically easily feasible – not
substituted by the low-cost input medium-skilled labor (nurses). The substitutabil-
ity of physicians exhibits some heterogeneity across different types of ownership.
Here, the results of physicians being easily substituted by nurses is first of all found
for non-profit hospitals but not for private for-profit clinics. This seems to indicate
that cost minimization is more relevant for the latter. Yet, the results does not in-
dicate much change over time. This is evidence against the hypothesis that in the
period 2006-2008 hospitals were still passing through a process to adapting to the
19
new DRG based remuneration systems and that profit-orientation matters for this
process. In particular, the results do not point at privately owned hospitals – i.e.
those that are explicitly operating for profit – moving to less care intensive service
provision, in order to provide less care that under the DRG-based remuneration
regime is no longer directly remunerated.
The empirical results have, however, to be interpreted with some caution. In par-
ticular the very small estimated values for the median technical elasticity of substi-
tution between physicians and nurses remain a puzzle. One possible explanation is
that the vast majority of hospitals are technically inefficient and do not operate on
the production possibility frontier. Yet, the concept of input-substitution is properly
defined only at the frontier. In the present analysis this issue was addressed by pro-
jecting observed input-output combinations on the estimated frontier and hence by
basing the analysis on hypothetical efficient input consumption rather than it ob-
served inefficient counterpart. However, this may result in numerous hospitals be-
ing projected on certain points at the production possibility frontier which – though
technically efficient – are highly inefficient in economic terms. This economic inef-
ficiency may result in the alleged ease of substituting physicians by other inputs.
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